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Iron Curtain Statutes-What is the
Standard of Constitutionality?
INTRODUCTION
The epic decision of the United States Supreme Court in Zschernig
v. Miller' has raised much controversy regarding Iron Curtain Statutes.2
As a consequence, probate courts are scrutinizing the legislation of
their own states which control the devolution of property to nonresident
aliens. The Zschernig decision has jeopardized the constitutionality of
all probate statutes. This article will proceed to analyze the probate
statutes and decisions, prior and subsequent to Zschernig, with an eye
toward showing that the state courts have overreacted to the decision,
and in many instances are applying it indiscriminately.
The fact situation portrayed in Zschernig is typical of problems
occurring when an Iron Curtain statute is applied. The appellants,
residents of East Germany, were the heirs of an American citizen who
died intestate. They would have been certain to inherit had they been
American heirs. Since they were nonresident aliens, however, one further
qualification had to be satisfied-the Oregon Revised Statute, section
111.070.3 This statute succinctly sets down the criteria for a foreign heir
to inherit: reciprocal rights for a United States citizen to inherit from a
decedent in the foreign country; proof that American heirs would
receive the funds from the foreign country; and assurance that the funds
1. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
2. "Iron Curtain statute" is the title that has been given to statutes that determine
the right of nonresident aliens to share in the property of American decedents. Since
the aliens whose rights are at issue are generally residents of Communist countries, the
name "Iron Curtain" became associated with these probate acts. Actually the terminology
is a misnomer since the statutes apply to all foreign heirs, whether or not domiciled
in a "Communist" country.
3. OaE. REv. STAT., tit. 12 § 111.70 (repealed 1969).
(1) The right of an alien not residing within the United States . . . to take either
.-real or personal property . . . in this state . . . upon the same terms and condi-
tions as inhabitants and citizens of the United States is dependent in each case:
(a) Upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the
United States to take . . . upon the same terms and conditions as inhabi-
tants... of the country of which such alien is an inhabitant ... ;
(b) Upon the rights of citizens of the United States to receive by payment to
them . . . money originating from the estates of persons dying within such
foreign country; and
(c) Upon proof that such foreign heirs . . . may receive the benefit, use or con-
trol of money .. . from estates of persons dying in this state without confisca-
tion . . . by the governments of such foreign countries.
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of American decedents would not be confiscated by the foreign govern-
ment. The statute, in conclusion, provided that if such reciprocal
rights were not present, and no other heirs were living, the property
would be disposed of as escheated property.4
This last provision is crucial since it characterizes the act as an
escheat statute. The result is that if the foreign heir can not carry his
burden of proof, all his rights as an heir are completely cut off. If there
are no heirs other than nonresidents the funds of the decedent escheat
to the state. This is not to be confused with a custodial statute5 which
merely impounds the funds until the heir can substantiate his status.
This latter statute which predominates among eastern states will be
discussed in greater detail infra.
The Oregon Supreme Court held that the heirs could take the real
property because a reciprocal treaty existed with Germany. Since Article
IV of the 1923 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights
with Germany had been construed in Clark v. Allen 6 to pertain only to
realty, the court was unable to find the required reciprocity concerning
personalty and as a consequence the personalty escheated.
The United States Supreme Court in reviewing the Oregon decision
noted a distinction between Clark and Zschernig. Clark was concerned
with the statute itself. It was there held that a general reciprocity clause
did not, in and of itself, intrude unconstitutionally into foreign affairs.
However, Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in Zschernig, was
primarily interested with the application of the statute. He stated:
It now appears that in this reciprocity area... the probate courts
of various states have launched inquiries into the type of govern-
ments that obtain in particular foreign nations . . . whether the
so called rights are merely dispensations turning upon the whim
or caprice of government officials, whether the representation ...
of foreign nations is credible . . . whether there is in the actual
administration in the particular foreign system of law any element
of confiscation.7
The high court injected that the escheat provisions of the statute had
traits of confiscation which contradicts the Just Compensation Clause
4. Id.
5. The custodial statute offers an entirely different philosophy in dealing with non-
resident heirs. Instead of the funds escheating to the state they are held in escrow by
the State Treasury until the court is convinced the heirs will have use and benefit.
When such proof is certain, the funds are transmitted to the heirs.
6. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
7. See note 1, at 433, 434.
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of the Fifth Amendment. The Justices, however, were troubled most
by the inquiries of the probate courts into the administration of foreign
law and the policies of foreign governments. It was this involvement in
foreign affairs by the state, an area entrusted solely to the federal
government, that formed the foundation upon which the statute was
declared unconstitutional. The court held that:
It seems inescapable that the type of probate law that Oregon
enforces affects international relations in a persistent and subtle
way. The practice of state courts in withholding remittances to
legatees residing in Communist countries or in preventing them
from assigning them is notorious. The several states of course have
traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates. But
these regulations must give way if they impair the exercise of the
Nation's foreign policy. [Emphasis added.]"
This language is of critical importance. When carefully analyzed the
words reveal that the Court was not concerned with the statute itself,
but the manner in which the statute was "enforced". It would not be
unreasonable to conclude that "enforced" as used in this context is
synonomous with "applied." Many of the state courts instead of having
referred merely to the foreign statute in determining whether reciproc-
ity existed, continued to blast the foreign governments' ideologies and
policies. These violent expressions-not the statutes-thrust the state
into foreign affairs. The opinion clearly presupposes more than a mere
interpretation by the probate courts of their respective statute; it pre-
supposes conduct which "impairs" foreign policy making. The decision,
in essence, proscribes any state from voicing foreign policy, especially
where the probate courts are used as mouthpieces. Hines v. Davidowitz9
was precedent that the area of foreign affairs is entrusted solely to the
President and Congress.
HISTORY OF THE STATUTES
A discussion of the origin and evolvement of Iron Curtain Statutes
is imperative to better understand the perplexities courts face today
when deciding whether a nonresident alien should share in an Ameri-
can's estate. The Iron Curtain Statutes were originally enacted during
World War II to ensure that property of Americans who died would
8. Id. at 440.
9. 312 U.S. 52 (1940).
244
Vol. 9: 242, 1970-1971
Comments
not be appropriated by foreign countries, to wage war against the
United States. It was against this background of turmoil that the legis-
latures took measures to determine the rights of foreign beneficiaries.
The statutes diverged into two distinct groups. On the one hand, the
custodial statutes became prominent in the eastern states. Their basic
philosophy emphasized a shielding of the estate from confiscation by
foreign governments. In so doing, the beneficiary's enjoyment and use
of the property was guaranteed. No attempt was made to alter the
substantive rights of the intended heirs. The money and/or other
property were impounded only when it appeared the legatee would not
receive the benefit of the wealth. This procedure placed the legal
rights of the heirs in abeyance until they could better substantiate
their inheritance.
Inasmuch as New York took the early lead in drafting a custodial
statute, it would be appropriate to use its language in illustration. The
present New York statute, section 2218,10 which is very similar to sec-
tion 269, of the original code, reads as follows:
Where it shall appear that a beneficiary would not have the benefit
or use or control of the money ... the decree may direct that such
money or property be paid into court for the benefit of the benefi-
ciary .... The money or property so paid into court shall be paid
out only upon order of the court.... .1
Early, In re Bold's Estate12 spelled out the purposes of this statute:
It contemplated no forfeiture to our state of the legacy ... of the
foreign beneficiary. It was intended to safeguard his rights by per-
mitting the moneys to be held until the time when it might be
shown that the beneficiary... would receive the funds. 13
On the west coast an opposing view developed. California was a
primary advocate of this new thinking. Its statute, section 259, provides
that the estate will escheat when reciprocity is not proven.
The right of aliens not residing within the United States . . . to
take real property in this state ... upon the same terms and con-
ditions as residents ... of the United States is dependent in each
case upon the existence of a reciprocal right .... If such reciprocal
rights are not found.., and if no heirs other than such aliens are
10. N.Y. CONSOL. LAws ANN., S.C.P.A., § 2218 (McKinney 1967).
11. Section 269 was the original Iron Curtain Statute for New York, but was replacedin 1960 by section 2218. Both sections deal with the rights of nonresident aliens. Id.
12. 175 Misc. 545, 18 N.Y.S. 2d 291 (1940).
13. Id. at 551, 18 N.Y.S. 2d at 297.
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found eligible . . . the property shall be disposed of as escheated
property.1 4
Immediately, a fundamental difference between the California statute
and the New York code is perceivable. The New York custodial statute
is procedural in nature and offers no threat to the heirs' right to inherit.
The California probate code (escheat statute), and those resembling it,
offer a "now-or-never" proposition. If the foreign heir can not produce
convincing evidence of reciprocal rights granted by his country permit-
ting American heirs to inherit, the beneficiary will be excluded forever.
Any rights the alien might have asserted are extinguished. The Califor-
nia court in In re Giordano's Estate,15 early held that the California
statute was not procedural and was intended to be part of the substan-
tive law of succession.
United States Supreme Court Decisions
Based on these two statutory approaches it was not surprising that
the constitutionality of the escheat statute was first tested. With its
emphasis on altering the substantive rights of foreign heirs, the statute
was suspect. In Clark v. Allen,' 6 section 259 of the California probate
code was attacked as an unconstitutional invasion by the state into the
field of foreign affairs. The argument was that the statute sought to
promote the right of American citizens to inherit abroad by offering to
aliens reciprocal rights of inheritance in California. The court rejected
this argument. 17 What must be understood, however, is that the court
was only considering the four corners of the statute; the application
of the statute was not discussed.
The second United States Supreme Court decision involving an Iron
Curtain statute was Kolovrat v. Oregon. s This time the court tested the
Oregon statute-also escheat. The same statute was later declared un-
constitutional in Zschernig. The right to take, as in all escheat statutes,
hinged on the reciprocity issue.
The case itself concerned two residents of Oregon who died intestate.
Those next of kin who stood to inherit the estate were all citizens of
14. CAL. CODE ANN., PROBATE, §§ 259, 259.2 (West 1956).
15. 85 Cal. App. 2d 588, 193 P.2d 771 (1948).
16. See note 6.
17. The court emphasized: "What California has done will have some incidental or
indirect effect in foreign countries. But that is true of many state laws which none
would claim cross the forbidden line." Id. at 517.
18. 366 US. 187 (1961).
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Yugoslavia. The Oregon Supreme Court found the heirs could not take
because the prerequisite reciprocity was lacking. The United States Su-
preme Court upon review concluded that a treaty between the United
States and Serbia, entered into in 1881, was controlling. Justice Black,
delivering the opinion of the Court, particularized that the state laws
controlling the right of aliens to inherit must bow when confronted by
the Constitution's supremacy clause. Federal treaties must always take
precedence over state law, regardless of the question. The Supreme
Court did not find the statute unacceptable for any other reasons.
The final major Supreme Court decision pertaining to the nonresi-
dent alien problem, prior to Zschernig, was Ioannou v. New York. 19
Ioannou represents the first challenge to the constitutionality of a custo-
dial statute. The facts showed that a Czechoslovakian assigned her in-
terest in an intestate share of an American decedent's estate to a resident
of England. The New York Surrogate's Court dismissed the petition by
the London assignee directing the treasurer to pay the share to her
attorney. When the case reached the Supreme Court, it was dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question.
At this stage in the development of Iron Curtain statutes, the consti-
tutionality issue seemed to stabilize. Custodial statutes had withstood
their only constitutional attack. The escheat statutes, although tottering
somewhat following the Kolovrat decision, had not been conclusively
declared unconstitutional. One could predict that if the statute did not
attempt to circumvent any existing federal treaties the act was consti-
tutionally sound.
Nevertheless, the Iron Curtain statutes by their very nature were
destined to engender legal controversy; if for no other reason because
these statutes convened three countervailing legal forces: (1) the domi-
nant position of the federal government in foreign affairs; 20 (2) the exclu-
sive right of the state to regulate rights of succession and intestacy;21 and
(3) the decedent's "right" to dispose of property as he sees fit.22 Although
19. 371 U.S. 30 (1962).
20. This maxim was substantiated in the Belmont case: "Plainly, the external powers
of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies. The
supremacy of a treaty in this respect has been recognized from the beginning. Mr. Madi-
son, in the Virginia Convention, said that if a treaty does not supercede existing state
laws, as far as they contravene its operation, the treaty would be ineffective." U.S. v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1936).
21. In Irving Trust Co. it was stated that the Tenth Amendment reserves to the
States the power to determine the manner of testamentary transfer of a domiciliary's
property and the power to determine who may be made beneficiaries. Irving Trust
Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1941).
22. It is a general proposition that the courts will try to carry out the intention
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these conflicting interests were certain to nurture further controversy,
the outcome of the Zschernig decision was unexpected. The majority
found an unconstitutional intrusion into foreign matters, even though
the terms of the treaty did not include the personality at issue. Clearly,
this result can not be reconciled with Clark which sustained the state
statute where no federal treaty had been interposed.
Shortly after Zschernig, the appeal of Goldstein v. Cox 23 confronted
the U.S. Supreme Court. This case, unlike Zschernig, questioned the con-
stitutionality of a custodial statute. In contrast to Ioannou, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment in the lower court, and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of Zschernig.
The real importance of Zschernig can only be measured by its impact
on the probate courts. This article will now focus on subsequent state
decisions. It is submitted that most lower courts have overreacted.
State Court Decisions
Pennsylvania, which has a custodial statute, has experienced several
cases of major importance since Zschernig. Before discussing the new
precedent a brief discussion of the statute prior to it would be helpful
to place subsequent decisions in perspective.
In Belemecich's Estate,24 Justice Musmanno distinguished the Penn-
sylvania statute25 from Oregon's, supra, by emphasizing that in a situa-
tion where the heirs could not meet their burden of proof, Pennsyl-
vania's code only impounded the estate, whereas the Oregon statute
appropriated the funds. Musmanno's rationale, which supported the
constitutionality of the statute, was abruptly overturned in Consul Gen-
eral of Yugoslavia at Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania.26 The Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari and reversed the lower court's
of the testator. However, it is not a right but a privilege which can be stricken if the
court so desires. "Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state
to limit, condition or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property
within its jurisdiction." Id. at 562.
23. 389 U.S. 581 (1968).
24. 411 Pa. 506, 192 A.2d 740 (1963).
25. Act of July 28, 1953, P.L. 674, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 1156 (Supp.
1970):
Whenever it shall appear to the court that if distribution were made a beneficiary
would not have actual benefit . . . of the money or other property . . . the court
shall have the power . . . to direct the fiduciary (a) to make payment . . . at such
times and in such manner and amounts as the court may deem proper, or (b) to
withhold distribution ... convert it to cash, and pay it . . . into the State Treasury
without escheat.
26. 375 U.S. 395 (1963).
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judgment in a per curiam decision. Kolvorat v. Oregon27 was cited as
sufficient precedent for the reversal. The court was silent, however, on
the constitutional ramifications of the decision. This case made the
constitutionality of the statute dubious.
The approach of the State Supreme Court in Wanson's Estate2 is
indicative of the court's effort to construe the statute in such a manner
as to assure favorable constitutional review. Justice Roberts stated:
We find nothing in the statutory language of the act or its objec-
tives which expressly . . . prohibits distribution of a decedent's
estate to a beneficiary not a resident of the United States ....
Foreign-residing beneficiaries are not made ineligible to take tes-
tamentary bequests, nor does the Act bar or preclude such gifts to
them.29
The Court proceeded to distribute the residuary of the estate to the
Rumanian heirs.
Pennsylvania responded to the Zschernig decision with Struchman-
czuk's Estate.30 The decedent died intestate, survived by a wife and
daughter, both domiciled in the Soviet Union. A new approach to the
distribution of the estate was taken. Instead of placing the funds in an
escrow account if probable benefit could not be shown, or transmitting
the entire funds to the Soviet heirs if they met their burden of proof, the
Court chose another alternative. Pursuant to the probate code, 3' only
portions of the estate were sent to the heirs. As the heirs demonstrated
their receipt, additional funds were forwarded. Exceptions were filed on
behalf of the Russian heirs in an effort to obtain the entire amount im-
mediately. Counsel for the widow and daughter argued that it was un-
constitutional to withhold the payment in a segmented fashion. The
argument declared such actions of the court crossed the boundary into
foreign affairs-an area intended to be preempted by the federal gov-
ernment. The tribunal briefly entertained the distinction drawn seven
years earlier in Belemecich that Oregon had escheat, as opposed to Penn-
sylvania's custodial language. Judge Klein, nevertheless, was not im-
pressed by the distinction, and based on the new posture taken by the
Supreme Court in Zschernig, he found section 1156 of the probate
27. See note 18.
28. 419 Pa. 109, 213 A.2d 631 (1965).
29. Id. at 112, 213 A.2d at 633.
30. 44 D. & C. 2d 155 (Orph. Ct. 1968).
31. See note 25.
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code,3 2 and section 737 of the Fiduciaries Act 33 as unconstitutional en-
croachments into foreign affairs. This conclusion was reached by the
Pennsylvania court's judging the constitutionality of the statute by
looking to its four corners, rather than evaluating the method of its
application. It is submitted that Zschernig was decided on a much nar-
rower issue. It was designed to stifle the practice of the local probate
judges injecting derogatory remarks toward foreign governments. The
statute should not have been invalidated until a further investigation
of lower court opinions revealed the type of unnecessary ridicule pro-
hibited by Zschernig. Perhaps the court in Struchmanczuk unconciously
recalled some of these recently proscribed outbursts for they are com-
monplace. In Zupko's Estate, Judge Bologer commented: "... We must
take judicial notice of the wholesale disregard of human and of prop-
erty rights in the U.S.S.R. and the complete lack of morals, as we know
them, pervading the operation of the Soviet system. 3 4 Judge Klein's
remark was similar in Soter's Estate:
We share hopes . . . that the 'Cold War' will thaw, and that the
nations of the world may find a way to live together . . . . Until
this happy day arrives, we must view events realistically. And this
requires us to conclude the citizens of Albania are being deprived
of their rights and liberties by a small group of despotic fanat-
ics .... " [Emphasis added.]
The court, however, failed to mention these frequent abuses of the
constitutional guidelines set down by Zschernig. Struchmanczuk as it
now reads could be cited for the proposition that the Pennsylvania
statute was unconstitutional on its face, which is not accurate. It is
improbable that the Supreme Court of the United States intended such
an interpretation of Zschernig. To do so would completely emasculate
the state's constitutional prerogative to determine the devolution of
property.36 To interpret Zschernig so broadly is to swing the pendelum
too far in the opposite direction, thereby improperly directing federal
involvement in purely state affairs. This authorization is also constitu-
tionally questionable.
32. Id.
33. Act of April 18, 1949 P.L. 512, PURDON's PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20 § 320.737 (Supp.
1970).
34. 15 D. & C. 2d 442, 454, 455 (Orph. Ct. 1958).
35. 34 D. & C. 2d 6, 9 (Orph. Ct. 1964).
36. The right to control the passing of property at death, as reserved to the states
under the Tenth Amendment was determined in Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556
(1941).
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A more recent Pennsylvania decision is Makery's Estate.37 The opin-
ion ordered funds that had been placed in escrow sent directly to the
beneficiaries. The court's decision was militated by Struchmanczuk.
Although the results of these cases may be just, there is no assurance
that such broad interpretation will continue rendering acceptable
conclusions.
Other state courts have handled the Zschernig decision differently.
New York's statute, section 2218, 38 is custodial and resembles the Penn-
sylvania law. The act was amended following Zschernig and a new sub-
division added, but it still reads as an eastern statute8 9
The major decision rendered since 1968, within New York's jurisdic-
tion, was In re Estate of Leikind.40 This case is significant, since even in
light of Zschernig, the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of
the statute. The petitioner applied for an order directing that his
judgment against Dvaireh Kamensky be satisfied out of funds placed in
escrow with the State Treasury. Dvaireh was a Russian resident and
beneficiary of the estate of Leikind. Her funds had been deposited
pursuant to the custodial statute applicable. The petitioner-creditor
based his argument squarely on Zschernig. He asserted that the New
York statute, like the Oregon legislation, was an unconstitutional en-
croachment into foreign affairs.
The court noted that unlike the Oregon statute, the New York law
contained no forefeiture provisions. It was further postulated that
this distinction could be critical in sustaining the New York statute.
The thrust of the opinion, however, was directed toward the statute's
application.
... [T]he majority opinion in the Zschernig case, in accepting the
constitutionality of 'reciprocity,' arguably accepted 'benefit, use or
control' provisions as valid provided State Courts did no more
than 'routinely read' foreign laws and provided there was no
palpable interference with foreign relations in their application.
Thus, if the courts of this state, in applying the 'benefit or use or
control' requirements, simply determine without animadversions,
whether or not a foreign country .... prevents its residents from
actually sharing in the estates of the New York decedents, the stat-
37. 46 D. & C. 2d 196 (Orph. Ct. 1969).
38. See note 10.
39. Section 269-a, the predecessor of § 2218, was interpreted as follows "That section
is intended to safeguard an inheritance by withholding it temporarily . . . until the
time arrives when the beneficiary might use and enjoy it for himself. In re Estate of
Petroff, 49 Misc. 2d 233, 236, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 8, 11 (Surrogate's Ct. 1966).
40. 22 N.Y. 2d 346, 239 N.E. 2d 550, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 681 (1968).
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ute would not be unconstitutional under the explicit rationale of
the Zschernig case. Indeed, petitioner has made no showing that the
lower courts ... engaged in the conduct criticized ... as interfer-
ence with foreign relations.41 [Emphasis added.]
This distinction is of manifest importance. A careful reading of Zscher-
nig affirms the approach taken by the New York court. Whether the
New York courts will continue to uphold their probate statute remains
questionable, but the subsequent cases to date attest to a continual
reaffirmance of Leikind.
Some questions were raised regarding the Leikind case when Gold-
stein v. Cox 42 was remanded to a three judge court for further con-
sideration of its constitutional issues. The petitioners moved for a sum-
mary judgment contending Zschernig v. Miller necessitated a conclu-
sion that section 2218 was unconstitutional on its face. Summary judg-
ment was denied and the appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of
the United States pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.43 The
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 44 The
court's handling of the case lends support to Leikind and its "applica-
tion" approach.
In, In re Estate of Becker,45 a resident of East Germany, petitioned
that certain moneys in the custody of the Director of Finance of New
York, be issued to him as lawful heir under the New York intestacy
statutes. The court recognized the constitutional obstacle which Zscher-
nig posed, but chose to follow the distinction adopted in Leikind. Judge
Silverman concluded that the alien had demonstrated use, benefit, and
control of the money and, therefore, the estate should be distributed
immediately. Perhaps an indirect influence of Zschernig can also be
detected from this New York decision. Although the tribunal inter-
preted Zschernig correctly, a trend toward lessening the burden of proof
for nonresidents is evident from Judge Silverman's opinion. Prior to
Zschernig many East Germans, situated similarly to those in Becker,
were denied their heirship because the "cold war" courts were not con-
vinced that the East Germans would receive the estate.4 The Becker
41. Id. at 352, 239 N.E. 2d at 553, 292 N.Y.S. 2d at 686.
42. 391 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1968) rev'd per curiam; Goldstein was briefly referred to
in the introduction. It was decided about the same time as Zschernig. This cite includes
the final appeal to the Supreme Court which culminated in the Court's dismissal.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1966).
44. 396 US. 471 (1970).
45. 61 Misc. 2d 46, 304 N.Y.S. 2d 628 (Surrogate's Ct. 1969).
46. In re Thomae's Estate, 199 Misc. 940, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 844 (1951), and In re Nezoldis
Will, 1 Misc. 2d 611, 148 N.Y.S. 2d 197 (1956), reached contrary results. In -both cases
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court, however, has apparently recognized private ownership in the
"Iron Curtain" countries.
The only case to date which casts doubt on the soundness of the New
York statute is the obscure decision, In re Estate of Emilia Lehotzky. 47
The Surrogate of Bronx County held that he had no right to impound
the proceeds of the estate. Instead, the court ordered that the resources
be sent directly to the beneficiaries. The impact of Lehotzky appears
negligible since it was never tested in the higher courts of the state.
It is suggested that the approach taken by the New York courts is the
better view. It is the stand which must be taken, if the states' right to
control the devolution of property is not to be eroded away.
Further insight into the probate courts' handling of the foreign heir
problem is provided by certain Ohio decisions. An analysis of Ohio's
post-Zschernig cases reveals the First National Bank of Cincinnati v.
Fishman48 decision where the court was confronted with that state's
custodial statute.49 The rationale suffered from the same infirmities as
the Struchmanczuk decision. Zschernig was applied in a carte blanche
fashion without an inquest into whether the statute was conducive to
actions forbidden by the Supreme Court.
Although the identical result was reached in Mora v. Battin, ° the
reasoning exhibited at least a technical understanding of Zschernig. It
was explicitly stated:
The Ohio statute requires the probate court to determine whether
or not the foreign legatee will have the benefit . . . 'because of
circumstances prevailing at the place of residence of such legatee.'
The Ohio statute thus appears to be directed at an inquiry into the
operations of the foreign government . . . and social conditions
prevailing in the foreign country. This type of inquiry is specifi-'
cally prohibited by the doctrine of Zschernig v. Miller.51
The approach enunciated in the Mora case is sensitive to the distinc-
tion drawn by the Supreme Court in Zschernig between the application
of the statute, and the statute itself. Only with this distinction in mind
can the Iron Curtain statutes be properly interpreted, at the state level,
under the Zschernig rationale.
the heirs were East German beneficiaries. In neither case could they satisfy the court of
their use and benefit since they were East Germans.
47. NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 29, 1968, p. 18.
48. 16 M. 85, 239 N.E. 2d 270 (Probate Ct. 1968).
49. OHIo REV. CODE ANN., tit. 21, § 2113.81 (1968).
50. 303 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ohio E.D. 1969).
51. Id. at 664.
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The discussion thus far has been limited to the reaction of custodial-
oriented states. Since Zschernig arose from an escheat state, attention
will be turned to examine the impact it has had on the western states.
California with its escheat statute is a prime example.5 2
Prior to the decision in Zschernig, In re Estate of Larkin53 illustrated
the position of the California courts regarding their probate laws and
the foreign heir dilemma. Based on voluminous reports and lengthy
testimony the court concluded that citizens of the United States enjoy a
reciprocal right to inherit property from Soviet estates on the same
terms, conditions and standards as Soviet citizens. 54 The court was quite
candid in its appraisement of the constitutional problem. The court felt
that whatever its reactions to the methods of the Soviet Union might be,
it must confine itself to the issues raised by the statute. To do otherwise
would unduly extend the province of the court.15
Had all the probate courts accepted this philosophy Zschernig would
never have been decided. This California tribunal saw the crux of the
problem at its incipiency. Nevertheless, not all the California decision
makers followed this lead. The judges in In re Estate of Kraemer,58
overreacted to Zschernig as did many others. Although the court may
have had a basis for its result,5 7 it again spoke in generalities. It simply
paralleled section 259 of the Probate Code with section 111.070 of the
Oregon Revised Statute, and concluded that since the two were similar,
California's statute must be unconstitutional.18 This is but another ex-
ample of Zschernig being misapplied.
A more logical interpretation of Zschernig is illustrated by Gorun v.
Fall,59 a Montana case, where section 91-52060 of the probate code was
52. See note 14.
53. 52 Cal. Rptr. 441, 416 P.2d 473 (1966).
54. Professor Harold Berman of the Harvard Law School and Harvard Research was
the principle witness. Based on personal experience and extended study he wrote an
enlightening article dealing with Soviet heirs. Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts,
62 COLUM. L. REv. 255 (1962).
55. See note 53, at 459, 416 P.2d at 491.
56. 81 Cal. Rptr. 287, 276 Cal. App. 2d 865 (1969).
57. Language which was forbidden by Zschernig was also evidenced in the California
courts:
We hold there is no such thing as a 'right' in the U.S.S.R., as we understand it in
this country. Soviet statutes merely confer conditional rights or privileges which . . .
may be withdrawn without the consent of the citizen at the whim of the government.
Matter of Estate of Gogabashvelle, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77, 195 Cal. App. 2d 503 (1961).
58. "And consequently under the same rationale, section 259 of the Probate Code . . .
which is substantially a restatement of subdivision I of the Oregon Revised Statute,
must also fall for the same reason." See note 56, at 294.
59. 287 F. Supp. 725 (D. Montana Helena Div. 1968).
60. MoNT. REV. CODES ANN., tit. 91, § 520 (1964);
No person shall receive money or property . . . as an heir . . . of a deceased person
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at issue. Plaintiffs, residents of Rumania, were certain to inherit unless
the probate code was contra. The heirs asserted Zschernig v. Miller as
precedent for finding the statute unconstitutional. The court made it
clear that Zschernig did not overrule Clark v. Allen, nor did it declare
reciprocity statutes, ipso facto, unconstitutional.
It seems clear from Zschernig that reciprocity statutes are not un-
constitutional per se and that if a state reciprocity statute requires
that the state courts do no more than read the law of a foreign
nation . . . then the law does not infringe upon the prerogatives
of the court.61 [Emphasis added.]
The court in its analysis further stated that, in interpreting the Mon-
tana law previous to the 1966 amendment, 62 questions of foreign law
were factual. The change in procedure, however, made these inquiries
a legal issue. The application of section 91-520 was found responsive to
the requirements set forth in Zschernig, and the statute was found
constitutionally acceptable.
Gorun v. Fall, furnishes the states with another possible solution when
confronted with an "Iron Curtain" situation. With a procedural change
making the determination legal rather than factual, the courts are pre-
cluded from probing into the political, social and philosophical aspects
that are so patently enjoined by Zschernig.
CONCLUSION
This article should make it obvious that a very real need exists for a
careful interpretation of the Iron Curtain statutes. A majority of the
courts are applying Zschernig too broadly. The decision was intended
to terminate probate action that intruded into foreign relations. These
misapplications are certain to have constitutional overtones, especially
where states are deprived of their control over the passing of property at
death.
Gorun v. Fall, in an escheat state, and In re Estate of Leikind in a
custodial jurisdiction, provide working alternatives to avoid invalidating
the respective Iron Curtain statutes as unconstitutional per se. Gorun,
leaving an estate . . . in the state of Montana, if such heir . . . is not a citizen of
the United States and is a resident of a foreign country, at the time of death . . .
unless, reciprocally the foreign country in question would permit the transfer to an
heir . . . residing in the United States, of property left by a deceased person in said
country.
61. See note 59, at 728.
62. Rav. CODES OF MorT., ch. 2701, RuLErs OF Cvu. PRoCEDuRE-RULE 44.1 (1969).
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by adopting its procedural law, and Leikind, by recognizing the "ap-
plication" distinction, may provide solutions to the quandary concern-
ing foreign inheritance.
The final tribunal, the United States Supreme Court, could also
render assistance in dealing with these statutes. Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion in Zschernig should be noted. Harlan draws attention
to Justice Brandeis's opinion in Ashwander v. Valley Authority: "The
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of. .... 1-3 Justice Harlan believed the
same result could have been achieved by construing the 1923 treaty so
that the Oregon statute was non-applicable. He suggests that the courts
should determine initially whether the statutes include reciprocal pro-
visions; if they do not the constitutional issue is never reached. Further-
more, he considered the facts of Zschernig indistinguishable from Clark
v. Alen, and that Clark should have served as precedent for Zschernig.
Thus, the Iron Curtain predicament could be bypassed by avoiding
constitutional issues where possible. Although the approach offered by
Harlan would be useful in most foreign heir situations, a case similar to
Zschernig would have been forthcoming regardless--certain probate
courts had to be muffled. It is hoped that by silencing the state courts
in foreign matters, they are not also handcuffed in controlling the de-
volution of property.
FREDERICK B. GIEG, JR.
63. 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1935).
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